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Introduction
Clarity seems to be a privilege of the powerful. The less fortunate among us are typically vaguer about their desires and need to think harder about what they say or do not say. Social psychologists have found that workers are more assertive in communicating their desires towards lower ranked co-workers than towards higher ranked co-workers (Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) , Yukl and Falbe (1990) ). Gender studies point to a similar pattern in patriarchal societies, where women are found to be more hesitant in stating their wishes and interests than men. 1 The relation between power and clarity could be shaped primarily by history and culture. In the communication literature, the link between power and communication is widely recognized (Keating, 2009) and believed to be strongly mediated by culture (Gudykunst and Lee, 2003) .
High status individuals are typically approached with more respect and too clear a message by a lower ranked individual about her preferences might simply be seen as 'disrespectful.' Similarly, direct communication of preferences may result in the loss of face of the powerful person if it openly contradicts her wishes or of the less powerful person if her wishes are ignored. In contrast to the above disciplines, in economics the relation between power and communication is a largely untouched research area.
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In this paper, we explore the possibility that there is a fundamental strategic foundation for the relation between power and clarity. We focus on bargaining under asymmetric information, as this is a common type of interaction where clarity matters. One can think of labor negotiations between managers and 1 When discussing the source of miscommunication between men and women, some authors emphasize the role of power relations while others stress the role of culture (Baer (1976) , Butler (1976) , Maltz and Borker (1982) , Henley and Kramarae (2001) ).
2 As far as we know, in economics the only research touching on this subject concerns how the level of connectedness in a network affects the bargaining power of individuals in bilateral negotiations (Calvó-Armengol, 2001 ). employees, divorce negotiations between men and women, or multinationals bargaining about merger remedies with a competition authority.
How does power come into play in such situations? Importantly, the consequences of disagreement differ among agents with different levels of power.
Simply put, agents in a more powerful position have better outside options.
This power can firstly be due to institutional or cultural rules. For instance, central banks are more powerful if they are backed up by strict laws. Similarly, a manager is more powerful in countries where employees can be fired easily (such as the US) than in countries where employees have lots of protection (such as France). Finally, in countries with Islamic law, men have more rights than women at divorce, whereas in most Western countries women tend to have at least equal rights at divorce. Secondly, power can come from social, political or economic resources. For instance, a worker has more bargaining power if the labor market is tight. And even in communities where women have equal legal rights but tend to work in unpaid jobs, men tend to have a superior economic position when filing for divorce. In sum, power affects the costs of disagreeing for agents in bargaining settings.
We think about clarity as informational clarity: how much does someone learn about the state of the world from a message? The informational clarity of a message can firstly depend on its literal clarity: the indirectness, inexplicitness, vagueness or ambiguity of the words used (Cheng and Warren (2003) , Agranov and Schotter (2010) ).
3 In a single interaction with a stranger from a culture one does not know, the literal meaning is all one can go by. Secondly, if people share a cultural and social history, the information messages convey also depends on how messages are used. For instance, the precise statement "I'll come to your office at four o'clock" is in some (office) cultures not at all informative, because people use it under a wide range of intentions as when to come. By contrast, in some countries the ambiguous phrase "We may not appreciate it if your market share exceeds 25%" can be highly informative if such a formulation is only used when officials from the competition authority intend to reject the merger proposal. The more history people share, the more the clarity of messages will depend on their use. It is now possible to translate our original question of how power influences clarity into a precise one: how does bargaining power influence information transmission in equilibrium? We study this question in an elementary bargaining setting. A Sender with private preferences and a Receiver with commonly known preferences bargain over a one-dimensional issue. 4 The Sender sends a costless message to the Receiver, after which they play an ultimatum game in which the Sender can reject or accept the proposal of the Receiver.
We find that bargaining power is a key determinant of how much information can be transmitted: information transmission is increasing in the Sender's power and decreasing in that of the Receiver. In other words, the higher the relative power of an informed agent, the clearer she will be. There is one exception: Senders who have no bargaining power can fully reveal their type since they will be offered the Receiver's preferred outcome anyway in equilibrium.
We see our results primarily as a proof-of-principle, as many power relations and strategic settings are more complex in practice. At the same time, we believe that the intuition behind our results holds more generally. If you hold little power, it is not in your best interest to reveal too much information, because that can be exploited. Hence, you had better be kind of vague and strategic about what you communicate. If you are powerful, the potential for exploitation is limited and you can afford to be clear.
In addition to shedding light on power relations, this paper contributes to the theoretical literature on bargaining and information transmission. Our model differs from previous models in that the private information of the 4 We refer to the Sender as a 'she' and the Receiver as 'he.'
Sender does not determine her bargaining power. This allows us to separate power from private preferences and model the power agents have due to their social, political or economic position irrespective of their preference in a particular situation. Our model is close to that of Matthews (1989) , who was the first to study veto threats. In Matthews' model, however, the Sender's type determines her disagreement payoff, whereas in our model the disagreement payoff is an exogenous variable which is the same for all Sender types. Hence, we can model the power of a worker due to a tight labor market regardless of her preferences on unpaid leave or model the legal power divorcing men have in Saudi Arabia regardless of their individual preferences about how much they want to see their children.
Our modeling choice has profound implications for information transmission.
Matthews finds that information transmission is fundamentally limited in his veto-setting, as the maximum equilibrium size is two in his model. From our results, we learn that this result hinges on the disagreement point being on the line. In our setup, a full range of Crawford-Sobel-like partition equilibria exists, allowing for more refined communication. In particular, the role of power in our model mirrors the role of interest-alignment in the Crawford-Sobel game to a large extent. Conceptually, the key difference is that Sender types whose preferred bargaining outcome is close to the Receiver's preferred outcome may completely reveal their information, whereas complete separation is never possible in the Crawford-Sobel model.
5
The literature on economic bargaining and information transmission has mostly focused on buyer-seller situations, where the outcome-set is zero sum conditional on trade (e.g. Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) and Farrell and 5 In our analysis, we look at standard preferences and do not take a possible aversion to lying (Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani, 2007; Kartik 2009 ) into account. One justification would be that the Sender may send a message with a proposed action rather than one containing a claim about her type. We also abstract from endogenous reputation building that could arise in repeated interactions (Sobel, 1985) . Gibbons (1989) ). In these models, the bargaining power of the other party is typically unknown, so that power and private information again coincide. 6, 7 Finally, our model has various interesting applications. In the conclusion we discuss testable economic implications for labor contracts and for remedies merging firms propose to competition authorities.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents a simple example of our model that serves to illustrate our set-up and results.
Section 3 presents the model and the results. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Example
In this section, we consider a linear example to illustrate the main results from our general model.
The model
Consider a cheap talk game with veto threats between an informed Sender (she) and an uninformed Receiver (he). The outcome of the game x is a point on the interval [0, 1] 
. The Sender's payoff on the interval depends on the state of the world t (her type):
The larger the distance between the outcome x and her type t, the lower the Sender's payoff. The Sender is privately informed of her type t, while it is commonly known that t is drawn from the uniform distribu-
R U x x = -is independent of t: he always prefers smaller outcomes to larger ones. We vary the payoff of the disagreement point to the players: ( ) we have: 
Equilibria
Like Matthews (1989) , we employ a refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. First, we restrict the Receiver to play pure strategies. Second, we require that Sender types who plan to veto any equilibrium action send a message inducing an action a that maximizes ( , ).
S U a t This refinement is motivated on
the basis of Selten's (1975) trembling hand perfection argument: the Sender considers that she might tremble with a small probability and accept the Receiver's proposed action. From now on we refer to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying these two requirements simply as an equilibrium.
To provide a formal description of an equilibrium, we introduce some additional notation. Let for any set , S S D denote the set of probability distributions on S. Let T denote the Sender's type set and A represent the set of actions for the Receiver. In the example, [0, 1] .
A strategy for the arg max ( ( ), ) in the suppor t of ( ) ;
3. The Sender accepts the Receiver's action iff it gives her more utility than the disagreement point: Crawford and Sobel's (1982) and Matthews' (1989) her utility from the disagreement point because the receiver will choose action S a t d = -. As a consequence, the Sender has an incentive to mimic a higher type. More generally, it can be shown that there is a minimum distance be-tween any two equilibrium actions, so that the equilibrium action set is finite.
Together with the fact that Senders elicit the action closest to their type, this results in a well-ordered partition.
The number of equilibrium actions n is called the "size of the equilibrium".
In games with only partition equilibria, the size of the equilibrium provides a natural measure of information transmission, which is invariant to scaling (of the payoff, action or type space). Equilibrium size will correlate well with other measures, such as conditional variance, prediction error, ex-ante efficiency or ex-post efficiency, with the suitability of each depending on the context. 9 In all cheap talk games, a size-1 (pooling) equilibrium exists in which no information is transmitted. We say that more information is transmitted as the size of the equilibrium increases.
In this cheap talk barraging game, the most influential (most informative) equilibrium seems most plausible. Still, as in other continuous cheap talk games like that of Crawford and Sobel (1982) or Matthews (1989) , the equilibrium set is hard to refine. 10 In De Groot Ruiz, Offerman and Onderstal (2011a), we introduce the Average Credible Deviation Criterion and show that it selects a unique maximum-size equilibrium in the model presented in this paper (under some conditions). This criterion generalizes credible deviations approaches such as neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993) and announcement proofness (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1991) and does not suffer from non-existence.
In an experiment, we find support for the predictions of ACDC in a setting pertaining to the model we present here (De Groot Ruiz, Offerman and Onder-9 A problem of these measures is that they lack a natural dimension, such that they are typically not invariant to immaterial transformations of the game. For instance, the average prediction error or the conditional variance is not invariant to scaling of the type space and exante utility is not invariant to immaterial transformation of payoffs of subsets of the type set. The fraction of outcomes that is ex-post efficient does not suffer from this invariance problem, but is a rather crude measure.
10 Traditional signaling refinements in the vein of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) have no bite in cheap talk games, as messages are costless. In De Groot Ruiz, Offerman and Onderstal (2011a), we show that in the current game also the cheap talk refinements neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993) , announcement proofness (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1991) , the recurrent mop (Rabin and Sobel, 1996) and NITS (Chen, Kartik and Sobel, 2008) , are not selective and the non-equilibrium concepts of Credible Message Rationalizability (Rabin, 1990) and Partial Common Interest (Blume, Kim and Sobel, 1993) are not predictive. stal, 2011b). In particular, we find that the maximum size equilibrium organizes behavior best in all five games we study.
Power and Clarity
We now turn to the central question of this paper: How does power affect information transmission in equilibrium? To answer this question, let us study an example where we fix the Receiver's bargaining power by taking This game has two equilibria, a size-1 equilibrium and a size-2 equilibrium. In the size-1 equilibrium, the Receiver ignores all Sender messages and best responds to his prior beliefs. His optimal action involves a trade-off between maximizing the probability that the proposal is accepted and maximizing the payoff of the proposal conditional on acceptance.
Note that proposals Pr is accepted|t ( ) ( ) ,1
.
Higher size equilibria cannot exist. Suppose they did, then the Receiver would play at least three equilibrium actions 
It is readily verified that both players play a best response against each other, so that we have identified the maximum size equilibrium. Figure 2 represents the structure of this equilibrium. 
The general model
A Sender and Receiver play the following game with an outcome in 
Our results will often hold even when the Receiver's utility is not concave and (A5) does not hold, but these assumptions will greatly facilitate the construction of equilibria in Proposition 1 and prevents us from making tedious case distinctions. Figure 3 presents a graphical illustration of the model.
We now turn to characterizing the equilibrium set. The following lemmas are useful for establishing bounds on the equilibrium size.
Lemma 1 Any equilibrium of the game is a partition equilibrium.

Lemma 2 In equilibrium,
Lemma 3 In equilibrium,
Lemma 4 Let ( ) show that it allows us to find the maximum size equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Let n denote the maximum equilibrium size.
Proposition 1 is also interesting in the light of Matthews' (1989) result that the maximum equilibrium size is two in a veto-threats setting where the disagreement point is a point 0 R r > "on the line" independent of the Sender type . 
R t
Now, we are ready to establish our main result on the relationship between power and information transmission:
Proposition 2 (i) If the Receiver's bargaining power increases, n (weakly) decreases. (ii) If the Sender's bargaining power increases, n (weakly) increases.
Hence, the higher the bargaining power of the Sender relative to that of the Receiver, the more information that can be transmitted in equilibrium. Increasing the Receiver's bargaining power decreases the highest possible action x the Receiver will propose in equilibrium because of his more attractive disagreement point, he can afford to be less generous with respect to the Sender. As a consequence, the number of equilibrium actions that 'fit' in this equilibrium To further illustrate our findings, we return to our example in section 2. Observe that in this example, assumptions (A2)-(A5) are satisfied for the relevant
The maximum equilibrium size n is equal to 1 if
because all Sender types will accept the Receiver's most preferred action 0. a = Let max{0, min{ 2 ,1 }}.
Otherwise, the maximum equilibrium size is at least 3 and the highest possible equilibrium action equals .
x The minimum distance between consecutive strictly positive equilibrium actions
Therefore, the maximum equilibrium size equals
Note that n is decreasing in 
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined how power shapes communication under information asymmetry. Our interest was to explore the levels of clarity that are likely to arise between agents with different levels of power. In a bargaining model with asymmetric information, we showed that clarity is indeed a privilege of the powerful. When negotiating an outcome, an informed bargainer with (relatively) little bargaining power cannot afford to reveal too much information, as that can be used against her. How much information can be transmitted in equilibrium depends crucially on the relative power of the informed party, the Sender: less information can be transmitted in equilibrium if either the Sender's power decreases or the Receiver's power increases.
12
In addition to providing a proof-of-principle, our analysis has testable implications for communication and outcomes in the field. 13 One application concerns contract negotiations between employers and employees. Here, asymmetric information and bargaining power play a significant role. One can think of an employee's preference for the work-life balance (salary versus flexibility) or the type of activities she is required to do. For instance, when a department negotiates with a potential new professor about her administrative and teaching duties, the preference of the professor for administration versus teaching are typically unknown. One implication of our analysis is that when the employee has more bargaining power, she will be able to convey her preferences more precisely. As a measure of bargaining power one could use the level of skill of employees or the unemployment rate in a given sector and/or year. Our model predicts that as information transmission increases, the variety of outcomes also increases. As a consequence, our model predicts that the variety 12 Che and Kartik (2009) find that difference of opinion (i.e. how much prior beliefs are aligned) can also be a crucial factor in determining what and how much information transmission is transmitted. 13 In addition, in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman and Onderstal (2011b) we test our predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment and find that the relative power of the Sender increases information transmission.
of labor contracts in a specific job market should be increasing with the employment rate (in the sector) and the skill-level required for the job.
Another application where our model has testable implications is negotiations between a competition authority and two firms planning a merger. If the merger creates or strengthens market power in the relevant market, the competition authority can demand remedies, such as requiring the firms to sell some production-lines to a third party. 14 Another possible trade-off for competition authorities concerns collusion (Compte, Jenny and Rey, 2002) . A merger reduces the number of competing firms, which can make collusion easier. However, if a merger involves the largest firm, it can also increase asymmetries in capacity constraints, making collusion more difficult. 15 For comparative work on competition authorities in Latin America, see Schatan and Rivera (2008) and Qaqaya and Lipmile (2008) ; For competition authorities in Europe, see Cseres (2010 
and for a smaller than but close to
Therefore, it follows that x is the highest possible equilibrium action if the equilibrium size is at least 3. 
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